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WHERE DOES NEW YORK CITY GO FROM
HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY?
Victor A. Bolden*
A year before his death, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
asked America in the title of his last book: Where Do We Go From
Here: Chaos or Community?1 Despite the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 3 King seri-
ously questioned America's continued commitment to justice and
equality for all in 1967. 4 For many African-Americans at that time,
despair and nihilism about the progress of the civil rights struggle
replaced euphoria and optimism. The prospects for maintaining a
non-violent movement for racial justice and equality ebbed as riots
seemed an acceptable means for expressing discontent with the sta-
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. Ad-
junct Professor, New York Law School. A.B., Columbia, 1986; J.D., Harvard, 1989.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not reflect the views of the
NAACP. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Jennifer Baszile,
Marianne Engelman Lado and Dennis Parker.
1. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY? (Beacon Press 1967).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified at scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
4. See KING, supra note 1, at 5 ("Overwhelmingly America is still struggling with
irresolution and contradictions. It has been sincere and even ardent in welcoming
some change. But too quickly apathy and disinterest rise to the surface when the next
logical steps are to be taken. Laws are passed in a crisis mood after a Birmingham or
a Selma, but no substantial fervor survives the formal signing of legislation. The re-
cording of the law in itself is treated as the reality of the reform."); id. at 10 ("The
legal structures have in practice proved to be neither structures nor law. The sparse
and insufficient collection of statutes is not a structure; it is barely a naked framework.
Legislation that is evaded, substantially nullified and unenforced is a mockery of the
law. Significant progress has effectively been barred by equivocations and retreats of
government - the same government that was exultant when it sought political credit
for enacting the measures.").
5. Id. at 44-47 ("What was new about Mahatma Gandhi's movement in India was
that he mounted a revolution of hope and love, hope and nonviolence. This same new
emphasis characterized the civil rights movement in our country dating from the
Montgomery bus boycott of 1956 to the Selina movement of 1965. We maintained the
hope while transforming the hate of traditional revolutions into positive nonviolent
power. As long as the hope was fulfilled there was little questioning of nonviolence.
But when the hopes were blasted, when people came to see that in spite of progress
their conditions were still insufferable, when they looked out and saw more poverty,
more school segregation and more slums, despair began to set in."). See also id. at 32-
36.
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tus quo.6 At the same time, King contended that "white America
has had a schizophrenic personality on the question of race,"' 7 tak-
ing a step backward on the issue of racial justice every time it took
a step forward.8 For King, that time in history may have been the
"last chance to choose between chaos and community."9
Nearly thirty years later, the New York City Human Rights
Commission ("Human Rights Commission") must ask, Where does
New York City go from here: chaos or community? If the preva-
lent degree of residential segregation is any indication, Professor
Michael H. Schill's article suggests that the answer may be
"chaos." 10 The degree of residential segregation experienced by
African-Americans in New York City is quite high." These hous-
ing patterns are affected by the fact that whites prefer neighbor-
hoods where few, if any, blacks reside, and their existence cannot
be explained by economic factors, such as income. 2 Indeed, the
empirical evidence indicates that African-American residents of
New York City experience a considerable degree of housing dis-
crimination and at a higher rate than residents of several other cit-
ies.13 Professor Schill recommends as a solution that, inter alia, the
Human Rights Commission focus on systemic investigations and
prosecutions of housing discrimination complaints.' 4
This Article will chart a different course. New York City must
move away from "chaos" and move towards "community." Main-
taining or increasing the current levels of residential segregation
will only lead to "chaos." Reducing segregation is necessary for
the building of one free and fair society for all in the "community."
The Human Rights Commission must develop a legal agenda for
investigating and prosecuting housing discrimination cases and, in
so doing, seek to foster "community." The purpose of this Article
6. See id. at 54-63.
7. KING, supra note 1, at 68.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 191.
10. Michael H. Schill, Local Enforcementof Laws Prohibiting Discrimination In
Housing: The New York City Human Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 991
(1996). Professor Schill's article discusses other aspects of housing discrimination,
such as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, familial status and physical
capabilities. I will focus only on the issue of race.
11. Id. at 994. This Article will discuss the issue of residential segregation in terms
of whites and blacks, although issues involving Latinos are included in Schill's
analyses.
12. See id. at 995.
13. See id. at 996-99.
14. Id. at 1026-29.
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is to assist the Human Rights Commission in a move towards
"community."
Part I briefly explains or "makes" the case for "community." A
critical question to be raised and answered is whether there is an
incentive to seeking "community" rather than "chaos." The case
for "community" begins with finding a basis for continuing the
struggle and returns to the words of Dr. King. The struggle for
justice and equality may be marked by periods of despair, but will
not end this way. Moreover, the consequences of not continuing
the struggle are too dire to contemplate.
Part II defines the barriers to community. Assuming that cur-
rent patterns of residential segregation suggest "chaos," the evolu-
tion of and the forces perpetuating "chaos" must be understood.
The two critical barriers to "community" are institutional and indi-
vidual acts of discrimination. Both institutional and individual acts
of discrimination make up the present structure of residential seg-
regation. In analyzing institutional acts of discrimination, the inter-
relationship between public and private entities and their role in
creating and perpetuating residential segregation must be dis-
cussed. Professor Schill's analysis is deficient in this respect. 15 In
analyzing individual acts of discrimination, the set of assumptions
behind these acts must be discussed. Institutional and individual
acts of discrimination must be examined together as well as sepa-
rately. The combined effect of these acts is synergistic, creating
and perpetuating a cycle of housing discrimination.
Part III considers strategies for dismantling the two barriers to
"community." This section outlines a litigation strategy that ad-
dresses residential segregation generally and suggests how the
Commission can implement this strategy specifically. Any viable
litigation strategy must address institutional and individual acts of
discrimination. Given these barriers, any such viable litigation
strategy must include both systemic and individual litigation that
seeks to dismantle the structure of residential segregation. As one
example of the type of systemic litigation suggested, this part dis-
cusses NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.,16 an insurance
"redlining" case. The Commission should adopt the litigation
strategy that this case utilized. It should not pursue only systemic
litigation, as Professor Schill suggests. 17 By continuing to file and
prosecute both individual and systemic cases, the Commission posi-
15. See id. at 992-99.
16. 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993).
17. See Schill, supra note 10, at 1026.29.
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tions itself most effectively to address the structure of residential
segregation.
I. Making The Case For Community
Creating "community" is not simple. In New York City, some
might argue that the task is impossible. Mourning the reality of
residential segregation seems easier than engaging in a dedicated
struggle against it. Nevertheless, there cannot be a meaningful dis-
cussion about changing the law or changing the focus of an institu-
tion, like the Human Rights Commission, without evidence that
the goal of creating "community" is a vital one. The case for "com-
munity" is not easy, but it can be made.
Dr. King offered a framework for looking past today's turbulent
times to tomorrow's promise of something better. Any strategy to
end residential segregation must be realistic. Impending "chaos"
did not emerge suddenly. "Community" will not be created imme-
diately. More importantly, to abandon the effort now suggests that
no progress was ever made.18 King adopted a broader view of ef-
forts to create "community":
A final victory is an accumulation of many short-term en-
counters. To lightly dismiss a success because it does not usher
in a complete order of justice is to fail to comprehend the pro-
cess of achieving full victory. It underestimates the value of con-
frontation and dissolves the confidence born of a partial victory
by which new efforts are powered. 19
Professor Schill also makes the case for "community." Schill
paints a bleak picture of the reality of residential segregation,
which compels a response. "[R]ace discrimination plays an impor-
tant role contributing to high levels of racial segregation in the City
and inferior neighborhoods and housing conditions for racial and
ethnic minorities."2 0 The resulting "concentrated poverty has
enormous social consequences for New York City's minority resi-
dents."' 21 African-Americans who live in racially isolated and pov-
erty-stricken neighborhoods will be far more likely than other
Americans to live in substandard housing, have dim job prospects
18. KING, supra note 1, at 12 ("[T]he line of progress is never straight. For a pe-
riod a movement may follow a straight line and then it encounters obstacles and the
path bends. It is like curving around a mountain when you are approaching a city.
Often it feels as though you were moving backward, and you lose sight of your goal;
but in fact you are moving ahead, and soon you will see the city again, closer by.").
19. KING, supra note 1, at 12-13.
20. Schill, supra note 10, at 1003.
21. Id. at 1004.
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and be mired in poverty.22 The cost of not addressing residential
segregation is too high. As Massey and Denton put it:
For America, the failure to end segregation will perpetuate a
bitter dilemma that has long divided the nation. If segregation
is permitted to continue, poverty will inevitably deepen and be-
come more persistent within a large share of the black commu-
nity, crime and drugs will become more firmly rooted, and social
institutions will fragment further under the weight of deteriorat-
ing conditions. As racial inequality sharpens, white fears will
grow, racial prejudices will be reinforced, and hostility toward
blacks will increase, making the problems of racial justice and
equal opportunity even more insoluble. Until we face up to the
difficult task of dismantling the ghetto, the disastrous conse-
quences of residential segregation will radiate outward to poison
American society. Until we decide to end the long reign of
American apartheid, we cannot hope to move forward as a peo-
ple and a nation.23
Therefore, the case for "community" is clear. There is no rea-
sonable alternative for a civilized society. The cost of doing noth-
ing is far greater than the risk of doing something.
II. Defining The Barriers To "Community"
An apocalyptic vision of a racially divided America may propel a
movement towards "community." Progress is not possible, how-
ever, absent an analysis of the barriers to "community." What put
America at the brink of "chaos?" What prevents the reality of
"community?" There are two such barriers: institutional and indi-
vidual acts of discrimination.
Professor Schill discusses only private actors or entities in
describing residential segregation. While private actors have
played and continue to play a critical role in the development of
residential segregation, it is also critically important to understand
the role played by government as public actors in contributing to
and influencing residential segregation in both private and public
housing. In order to understand the roots of residential segrega-
tion, the full range of institutional acts of discrimination must be
examined.
Public actors have played a role as critical as private actors in the
creation and maintenance of residential segregation. Federal, state
22. See id. at 999-1004.
23. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS, 235-36 (1993).
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and local governmental entities have all fostered racial discrimina-
tion in housing. Indeed, "redlining" was introduced by the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC), a federal New Deal program
designed to provide debt payment relief for those who were in dan-
ger of default on their home mortgages or whose homes had al-
ready been foreclosed.z4 The practice of rating neighborhood
value and quality by designating colors, with red being the least
desirable, resulted in the agency channeling funds away from the
"redlined" neighborhoods: those becoming or already predomi-
nantly African-American. 25 The Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and the Veterans' Administration (VA) later adopted this
rating system for use in its underwriting guidelines.26 While the
FHA and VA made it possible for many white Americans to own a
home, "redlining" by the FHA and the VA foreclosed the same
opportunity for African-Americans. 7
Racial discrimination by governmental entities extended to the
public housing market as well. Race became a means of determin-
ing how scarce public housing resources were allocated. For exam-
ple, between 1950 and 1965, the Chicago Housing Authority
(CHA) adopted a number of racially discriminatory policies.2 8
The "CHA followed a policy of informally clearing proposed fam-
ily public housing sites with the alderman in whose ward the pro-
posed site was located and of eliminating each site opposed by the
alderman. '2 9 As a result, "99 1/2% of the units proposed for sites
in white areas which had been initially selected as suitable for pub-
lic housing by CHA" were rejected. 30 The CHA also imposed quo-
tas on the number of African-American families allowed to reside
24. Id. at 51-52.
25. Id. at 52.
26. See id. at 53 ("Before [FHA], mortgages generally were granted for no more
than two-thirds of the appraised value of a home, so buyers needed to acquire at least
33% of the value of a property in order to make a down payment; frequently banks
required half the assessed value of a home before making a loan. The FHA program,
in contrast, guaranteed over 90% of the value of collateral so that down payments of
10% became the norm. The FHA also extended the repayment period to twenty-five
or thirty years, resulting in low monthly payments, and insisted that all loans be fully
amortized. The greater security afforded by FHA guarantees virtually eliminated the
risk to banks, which lowered the interest rate charged borrowers. When the VA pro-
gram was established, it followed practices established by the earlier FHA
program.").
27. See id. at 52-57.
28. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976).
29. Id. at 287 n.4 (citing lower court opinion at 296 F. Supp. 907, 910, 913).
30. Id. at 287.
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in predominantly white areas in Chicago. 31 Although about 90%
of the tenants in CHA were African-American, none of the four
housing projects built in predominantly white areas had an Afri-
can-American population greater than 10%.32 In short, the CHA
segregated public housing in Chicago, practically limiting it to Afri-
can-American neighborhoods. Where public housing existed in a
predominantly white neighborhood, only whites had a realistic
chance of living there.
These policies were not unique to Chicago. The New York City
Housing Authority (NYCHA) engaged in practices that also pro-
moted residential segregation. Even in this decade, the NYCHA
allegedly engaged in a number of practices, inter alia, restricting
applications for a housing project to families already living in that
neighborhood and using codes to indicate to NYCHA personnel
that certain housing projects were reserved for white families. 33
Other state and local governmental entities promoted residential
segregation under the guise of economic segregation. The New
Jersey Supreme Court denounced the activities of Mount Laurel,
New Jersey in seeking to exclude low- and middle-income hous-
ing.34 Communities in New York City have also sought to exclude
African-Americans, invoking class rather than race as the basis for
exclusion.35 Yonkers, New York experienced this type of racial ex-
clusion in the 1980s.36 In Yonkers, the dual realities of segregated
schools and housing patterns reinforced each other. The City of
Yonkers was found to "have played a significant role in the preser-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 839 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
34. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d
713, 724-25 (N.J.) (holding that a municipality "cannot foreclose the opportunity of
the classes of people mentioned for low- and moderate-income housing and in its
regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity at least to the extent of a mu-
nicipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefore. These
obligations must be met unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy bur-
den of demonstrating peculiar circumstances that dictate that it should not be re-
quired so to do."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.) (holding that a local government may
not block integrated housing developments where this action will have a racially dis-
criminatory effect and is not supported by a substantial justification), affd per curiam,
488 U.S. 15 (1988).
35. See generally MARIO CUOMO, FOREST HILTS DIARIES (1974) (detailing the
struggle of African-Americans moving into scatter-site low- and middle-income hous-
ing in the Forest Hills section of Queens, New York, one of New York City's five
boroughs).
36. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1526 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
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vation of East and Northwest Yonkers as overwhelmingly white
communities. '37 Indeed, as the Court held in that case:
The evidence of the City's intentional perpetuation of residen-
tial segregation . . . demonstrates that the City not only was
aware of the overall impact of its subsidized housing practices
on Yonkers public schools but also intended to preserve the ra-
cially segregative impact of these practices on the schools.38
The institutional acts of discrimination committed by govern-
mental entities reinforced the policies and practices of private insti-
tutions, such as banks, insurance companies and real estate
agencies. 39 If the FHA would not guarantee loans made in
predominantly African-American neighborhoods, then banks had
little choice but to factor FHA's decision-making process into their
own. This racially motivated decision had and still has economic
consequences. Whether public or private, these institutional acts
of discrimination served and serve as a barrier to "community."
When defining the impact of institutional acts of discrimination,
the historical effects of institutional policies and practices must be
identified. Professor Schill treats each incident of racial discrimi-
nation without sufficient regard to the historical pattern of discrim-
ination.4 0 He does not discuss how practices of the past still affect
residential segregation today. Mortgage "redlining" is a clear ex-
ample of this problem. If, at one time, the FHA placed a lower
value on homes in predominantly African-American neighbor-
hoods, then housing values in these neighborhoods will be lowered
over time, resulting in more mortgage "redlining." In short, yester-
day's mortgage "redlining" contributes to today's mortgage "red-
lining." In order to remedy current mortgage and insurance
"redlining," any legal action must stop the current racially discrimi-
natory practices and also address the impact of past racially dis-
criminatory practices.
Individual acts of discrimination also serve as a barrier to "com-
munity." Individual acts of discrimination include the decision of a
landlord to withhold an apartment on the basis of race, or that of a
real estate agent not to show an apartment in a particular neigh-
borhood for the same reason. In an individual act of discrimina-
tion, the action is undertaken by individual(s) acting on personal
beliefs, rather than pursuant to a company policy or practice, as in
37. Id. at 1364 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 1501.
39. See, e.g., KING, supra note 1, at 51-52.
40. See Schill, supra note 10, at 992-95.
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an institutional act of discrimination. Less than ten years ago, New
York City received a poignant reminder of how individual acts of
discrimination create a barrier to "community" in the Howard
Beach section of Queens, New York.
On December 19, 1986, an African-American man was killed
and two others injured by a white gang from Howard Beach who
were protecting "their" community. 1 The assumptions motivating
this act of discrimination have been aptly described by Professor
Patricia Williams." She divided them into the following six catego-
ries: (1) Everyone who lives here is white; (2) No black could live
here; (3) No one here has a black friend; (4) No white would em-
ploy a black here; (5) No black is permitted to shop here; and (6)
No black is ever up to any good.43
These six presuppositions rely on "certain lethal philosophies of
life." 44 First, the attackers were "better safe than sorry. ' 45 Know-
ingly or unwittingly, there is a view of life which equates white
neighborhoods as "safe" and blacks as being a threat to this
safety.4 6 Second, "a prejudiced society is better than a violent soci-
ety."' 47 There is a tendency to distinguish between bias and vio-
lence and to relegate bias to a lower status in terms of societal
concern. 8 As a result, "[w]ith the imperviously divided symmetry
of the marketplace, gains for whites are not felt as gains for blacks,
and social costs to blacks are simply not seen as costs to whites. 49
A third "lethal philosophy of life" involves justifying "turf
wars."50 The Howard Beach incident and the type of defense
mounted on behalf of the defendants in that case are the products
of a belief that: "black people ... need documented reasons for
excursioning into neighborhoods where they do not live, for ven-
turing beyond the bounds of the zones to which they are suppos-
edly confined. ' 51 Finally, there is a "lethal philosophy of life" that
Williams refers to as "privatized innocence and publicized guilt."'52
41. See CHARLES J. HYNES, INCIDENT AT HOWARD BEACH: THE CASE FOR MUR-
DER 17-25 (1990).
42. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
43. Id. at 59.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 59-60.
47. Id. at 61.
48. See WILLIAMS, supra note 42, at 61.
49. Id. at 62.
50. Id. at 67.
51. Id. at 68.
52. Id. at 69.
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Here, she discusses the actions of then New York City Mayor Ed-
ward I. Koch. After the Howard Beach incident, citizens who were
outraged by the incident organized and conducted a march through
the streets of Howard Beach.53 The mostly white residents of
Howard Beach reacted angrily to the march. 4 Mayor Koch tried
to explain the anger of the Howard Beach residents to the mem-
bers of a black church in Jamaica, Queens.55 As Williams explains
the incident:
He asked them how they would feel if fourteen hundred white
people took to the streets of Jamaica (a mostly black neighbor-
hood) in such a march. This question, from the chief executive
of New York City's laws, accepts a remarkable degree of posses-
siveness about public streets - possessiveness, furthermore,
that is racially and not geographically bounded. Koch was, in
effect, pleading for acceptance of the privatization of public
space. This is the de facto equivalent of segregation; it is exclu-
sion in the guise of deep-moated property "interests" and "val-
ues." Lost is the fact that the object of discussion, the street, is
public.5 6
Obviously, there are a number of more recent incidents around
the country and in New York City which indicate the challenge to
developing a singular vision of "community." However, Williams'
presuppositions and the underlying "lethal philosophies of life"
have to be a part of any meaningful discussion of residential segre-
gation in New York City or in this country. Her analysis sheds light
on the set of assumptions behind the individual acts of discrimina-
tion committed by a landlord or a real estate agent.57 As long as
this set of assumptions remains unchallenged and unchanged,
neighborhoods in New York City and any racially segregated
American city will remain that way. The conditions under which
housing discrimination operate may change, but the structure of
residential segregation will remain firmly in place.
Thus, racial bias initiates an ongoing cycle of discrimination
manifested in both institutional and individual acts. Institutional
acts of discrimination are merely a more sophisticated form of ra-
cism. The decision by the HOLC and then the FHA to "redline"
53. Id. at 69.
54. WILLIAMS, supra note 42, at 69. See also HYNES, supra note 39, at 3-5.
55. WILLIAMS, supra note 42, at 69.
56. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
57. On another level, this analysis helps explain the differences between whites
and blacks, in terms of their respective levels of tolerance for integrated communities.
See Schill, supra note 10, at 993-99.
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African-American neighborhoods reflects a "lethal philosophy of
life" as dangerous as the decision of a group of white youths from
Howard Beach to attack three African-American men for being in
their neighborhood. Unchallenged individual acts of discrimina-
tion become institutional acts of discrimination, and these institu-
tional acts contribute to more individual acts of discrimination.
III. Dismantling The Barriers To "Community"
A housing discrimination litigation strategy to dismantle the bar-
riers to "community" must focus on systemic and individual litiga-
tion. Neither systemic nor individual litigation alone addresses the
two barriers to "community." A coordinated campaign of systemic
and individual litigation, seeking far-reaching remedies, is more
likely to lead to the dismantling of the barriers of "community."
TWo cases in the area of mortgage and homeowner insurance "red-
lining" demonstrate the effectiveness of this type of strategy:
Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank58 and NAACP v.
American Family Mutual Ins. Co.59 In addressing residential segre-
gation in New York City, the Commission should adopt the type of
litigation strategy utilized in these cases.
By some measures, Chicago, Illinois is the most segregated city
in the United States.6 ° It is one of sixteen large American cities
considered to be "hypersegregated. '' 61 This level of segregation is
not surprising, given the extent of segregation in both the public
and the private housing markets.62 In this segregated environment,
opportunities for further segregation abound.
In Buycks-Roberson, a class of African-Americans are claiming
that a major lending institution in the area exploited just such an
opportunity. The plaintiffs allege that home loan applications of
58. Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322 (N.D. Ill. June
29, 1995).
59. NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 90-C-0759 (E.D.
Wis. consent decree filed July 13, 1995) (on file with the author).
60. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 23, at 72.
61. See id. at 75-76. There are five empirical measures used by sociologists to
measure segregation: (1) racial unevenness (blacks are overrepresented in some areas
and underrepresented in other areas); (2) racial isolation (blacks rarely share a neigh-
borhood with whites); (3) racial clustering (black neighborhoods are tightly packed to
form "one large continuous enclave"); (4) racially concentrated (blacks contained in a
very small area); and (5) racially centralized (blacks are spatially located in the urban
core). When a city is segregated on four of these five measures, it is considered to be
in a state of "hypersegregation."
62. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (describing the activities of the
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA)).
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African-Americans from the Chicago metropolitan area were re-
jected because of the race or racial composition of the neighbor-
hood in which their properties are located.63 While the case is still
far from resolved, the litigation has already made headway in the
struggle against residential segregation. The court certified a class
of African-American homeowners "who were denied home mort-
gage loans by Citibank on the basis of improper racial considera-
tions."'  The court dismissed the arguments raised by the
defendant bank regarding the uniqueness of the financial situations
of any two home mortgage loan applicants, recognizing the possi-
bility that a systemic injury could occur.65 As the court held: "Cer-
tainly, where the subjective decisions of Citibank employees allow
Citibank to systematically discriminate on the basis of race or the
racial composition of the applicant's neighborhood when choosing
among minimally qualified applicants, common issues of law and
fact exist regardless of individual differences. 66
The Buycks-Roberson case supports the notion that African-
American homeowners can challenge a set of lending policies and
practices, not just their own individual outcomes. This type of chal-
lenge will force financial institutions to examine all of their institu-
tional policies and practices which result in the denial of housing
opportunities to African-Americans.
Like Chicago, Milwaukee is also one of the sixteen American
cities considered to be hypersegregated. 67 In 1990, Milwaukee was
considered the most segregated city in America on a number of
measures.68 Where African-Americans live in the City of Milwau-
kee is easy to determine:
According to the 1990 Census, the overwhelming majority
(78.2%) of African Americans in Wisconsin reside in the City of
Milwaukee, in a discrete, well-defined geographic area. Further,
63. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Buycks-Roberson (No. 94-C-4094) (on ifie
with the author).
64. Buycks-Roberson, 162 F.R.D. at 388.
65. Id. at 329 (quoting Pis. Mem. at 6; Pls. Reply at 5). The Court found that two
common issues of law and fact had been identified: (1) whether Citibank employed
policies or engaged in practices or procedures which resulted in the denial of African-
Americans' home loan applications on the basis of the applicant's race; and (2)
whether Citibank personnel practiced redlining by applying its underwriting criteria
in a subjective manner which resulted in the denial of home loans to African-Ameri-
cans in predominately African-American communities.
66. Id. at 330.
67. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 23, at 75-76.




the census indicates that as of 1990, almost ninety percent of the
city's African American population resided within the area
bounded by the following streets: the Stadium Freeway from In-
terstate 94 to North Avenue, North Avenue to 51st Street, 51st
Street to Hampton Boulevard, Hampton Boulevard east to the
Milwaukee River, and south along the Milwaukee River to In-
terstate 94, and west on Interstate 94 to the intersection with the
Stadium Freeway.69
In 1990, a group of African-American homeowners from Mil-
waukee filed suit against the American Family Mutual Insurance
Company, alleging racial discrimination in the company's provision
of homeowners' insurance. Plaintiffs alleged that American Family
refused to do business in the predominantly African-American
community of Milwaukee or did so on less favorable terms, violat-
ing their rights under the fair housing laws.70 This litigation also
resulted in important case law for the purpose of determining what
types of activity can be addressed by fair housing laws.
Defendant American Family argued that even if homeowner in-
surance was denied or provided on the basis of race, this activity
did not necessarily result in the denial of a housing opportunity.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held otherwise.71 As
the Seventh Circuit stated, "[L]enders require their borrowers to
secure property insurance. No insurance, no loan; no loan, no
house; lack of insurance thus makes housing unavailable."72 The
ruling in the American Family case marked the first time a federal
circuit court recognized that insurance "redlining" was an actiona-
ble practice of housing discrimination.
Obviously, systemic litigation must do more than just clarify the
right to redress institutional acts of discrimination. It must provide
meaningful remedies. With systemic litigation, the goal should be
to ensure that the defendant or defendants in the case alter their
behavior and do so in such a way as to undermine the structure
currently supporting residential segregation. A prime example of
this type of fair housing litigation is the settlement reached in
American Family.
In American Family, the plaintiffs, who at the time of the settle-
ment included private plaintiffs and the United States Govern-
ment, reached a settlement that makes the case a model for
69. Consent Decree at 2 n.1, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
70. Complaint at 1, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
71. NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993).
72. Id. at 297.
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systemic litigation. On every level, from injunctive relief to mone-
tary relief, the settlement not only stopped the economically dam-
aging practices of a financial institution, but also ushered in a new
era for predominately black neighborhoods in Milwaukee, one
likely to lead to economic investment rather than disinvestment.
As the agreement states:
This consent decree is the product of negotiations among the
parties designed to achieve several remedial objectives shared
by the parties, including: (1) compensating for past disparities in
the availability of American Family insurance in the predomi-
nantly African-American community in Milwaukee; (2) enhanc-
ing the availability of American Family homeowners insurance
in that area in the years to come; (3) offering such insurance to
qualified applicants in all segments of the Milwaukee metropoli-
tan area; and (4) investing in the future of that community
through these steps.73
As this description suggests, the agreement provides for substantial
relief in numerous forms.
First, the settlement includes substantial injunctive relief. Amer-
ican Family has agreed to intensify their marketing efforts to cap-
ture a larger percentage of the African-American homeowners'
insurance market. Advertisements will be placed in African-
American publications and other media.74 In addition, "American
Family will devise sales strategies to assist agents in originating
more [insurance] policies in the predominantly African American
community."' 75 Efforts are to be made to hire sales agents for an
office in this community.76 Sales agents will maintain logs detailing
their contacts with consumers to ensure that African-Americans
who call in will not be discriminated against.77 The most dramatic
change in marketing will be the introduction of new policy offer-
ings and changes in the procedures for determining eligibility for
American Family policies. American Family has agreed to create a
new homeowners insurance product, designed to provide African-
American homeowners with access to replacement-cost coverage,
as opposed to the inferior repair-cost coverage. 78 American Fam-
ily's underwriting practices-the standards for determining eligibil-
73. Consent Decree at 3, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
74. Id. at 7-11.
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 10-11.
77. Id. at 11-12.
78. See id. at 12-14. Replacement cost insurance coverage ensures that, if damage
to the house occurs, the house will be fixed using the original construction materials.
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ity for insurance coverage-have been revised to reduce, if not
eliminate, the likelihood that race or the racial composition of a
neighborhood will affect eligibility for American Family insur-
ance.79 For five years following the entry of the consent decree,
American Family will be subject to evaluation to ensure that racial
discrimination in the provision of homeowners' insurance is no
longer a problem.8°
Second, the settlement provided for $5 million in monetary com-
pensation for African-Americans affected by American Family's
policies. 81 Four categories of individuals were eligible for mone-
tary relief: (1) named plaintiffs;82 (2) persons denied insurance;83
(3) persons receiving repair cost policies; 84 and (4) persons de-
terred from seeking insurance. 85 The named plaintiffs, who in-
cluded seven African-American homeowners and the Milwaukee
Branch of the NAACP, received $10,000 each from the claim
fund.86 $3 million or 60% of the funds allocated for monetary com-
pensation of individuals was provided for those persons denied in-
surance. 87 $1.5 million was allocated to those who applied to
American Family and received a repair-cost policy, rather than the
replacement-cost policy, which provides more comprehensive cov-
erage. 88 The remainder, or $420,000, was allocated to those indi-
viduals deterred from seeking American Family coverage.89
Repair cost insurance coverage provides for only the use of similar, but not original,
construction materials.
79. Consent Decree at 23-28, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
80. Id. at 33-34. The Consent Decree calls for "a minimum of fifty (50) paired
tests per year .... American Family will review the testing results with the relevant
individual employees and sales agents and will 'use the results to determine how to
address any concerns with them and whether changes in training are necessary." Id.
at 34.
81. Id. at 35.
82. Id. at 49.
83. Id at 49-51.
84. Consent Decree at 51-52, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
85. Id. at 52-54.
86. Id. at 49.
87. Id. at 51.
88. Id. at 52. The first distribution for this category of injury was for those who
received a repair-cost policy and suffered a loss, which was treated less generously
than it would have been if the loss had occurred while the homeowner had a replace-
ment-cost coverage policy. The remainder will be distributed in equal amounts to all
those persons who had repair-cost policies. Id.
89. Consent Decree at 53-54, American Family (No. 90-C-0759). The category of
deterred applicants have to demonstrate that they had reason to believe that Ameri-
can Family would not offer insurance coverage for some reason other than the exist-
ence of the NAACP litigation. Id. at 53.
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Third, the settlement provides for $9.5 million in community-
based relief.90 These "provisions are designed to alleviate the im-
pact of the lack of quality homeowners insurance in the predomi-
nantly African American community."91 There are four
components to the community-based relief: (1) interest-rate subsi-
dies;92 (2) financing-cost assistance;93 (3) homeownership counsel-
ing;94 and (4) emergency home-repair programs. Each of these
programs was made available through the cooperation of and con-
sultation with state and local governmental entities and the private
sector.
96
The interest-rate subsidies are available for home-mortgage and
repair loans and home-improvement loans.97 $4 million in loans
for purchase and repair are available to "homes in the predomi-
nantly African-American community that have experienced deteri-
oration or are otherwise in need of rehabilitation or repair. '98
These loans, offered through the WHEDA program, will be pro-
vided at a maximum of four percentage points below the currently
used interest rate.99 American Family will be subsidizing the differ-
ence between a market-rate loan and the subsidized loans. 100 $1.5
million in loans are "designed for the improvement and rehabilita-
tion of homes in the predominantly African-American community
which are already owned by the borrower."'' These loans will
also be provided at a maximum of four percentage points below
the current interest rate and the cost of the buy-down would be
subsidized by American Family.'0 2
Financing-cost assistance in the amount of $1.5 million will be set
up in conjunction with the City of Milwaukee. 10 3 These funds "will
be used by the City of Milwaukee through its Department of City
Development [DCD] to supplement its existing programs as ap-
90. Id. at 35.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 35-40.
93. Id. at 40-41.
94. Consent Decree at 41-42, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
95. Id. at 42-44.
96. Id. at 35-36. The state agency was the Wisconsin Housing and Economic De-
velopment Authority (WHEDA). The local governmental entity was the City of Mil-
waukee's special lending programs. Id. at 35.
97. Id. at 36-38.
98. Id. at 36.
99. Consent Decree at 36, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Id at 38-39.
103. Id. at 40.
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plied in the predominantly African-American community in order
to provide grants for financing cost assistance, including down pay-
ments, closing costs, mortgage insurance premiums, and appraisal
fees.' 1 0 4 In addition to the City of Milwaukee, non-profit commu-
nity groups serving Milwaukee's African-American community will
receive some portion of the funds.10 5 The eligibility criteria for
these programs will be the existing ones used by the City in its
programs, whether administered by the City or a non-profit com-
munity group. 10 6
The third component of the community-based relief obtained in
the American Family consent decree is homeownership counseling.
"American Family, through the City of Milwaukee, will help pro-
vide homeownership counseling for low- and moderate-income,
first-time home buyers seeking to purchase single family owner-
occupied homes in need of repair or rehabilitation in the predomi-
nantly African-American community.' 0 7 $500,000 will be allo-
cated for this purpose. 8 The funds will be provided to the City of
Milwaukee's Department of City Development for use in its ex-
isting programs and for distribution to non-profit community
groups. 0 9
The final component of community-based relief is an emergency
home-repair program. "American Family will make available
funds.., to help cover a portion of the costs needed to make emer-
gency repairs in homes in the predominantly African-American
community that have experienced deterioration or are otherwise in
need of rehabilitation or repair." 10 American Family will under-
write the costs of grants and loans for repair and improvement."'
$2 million will be allocated for this program."12
The predominantly African-American community in Milwaukee
has the chance to be compensated fairly for the lack of availability
of homeowner insurance. Individuals harmed directly by discrimi-
natory policies are to be compensated. More importantly, though,
economic incentives are created for the entire African-American
104. Id.
105. Consent Decree at 40, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
106. Id. at 40-41.
107. Id. at 41.
108. Id. at 41-42.
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id. at 42.
111. Consent Decree at 42-43, American Family (No. 90-C-0759) ("The loans will
have below-market interest rates and favorable repayment terms.").
112. Id. at 43.
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community in the form of innovative community relief. The com-
munity relief addresses every conceivable barrier to homeowner-
ship in inner-city Milwaukee and every possible reason for not
providing insurance to homes in that area. If there are solid mar-
ket values in homes, then there is a better atmosphere for provid-
ing insurance. If insurance is more readily available, then this will
stabilize and eventually improve the market values. The cycle of
disinvestment can be slowed. A cycle of investment and economic
growth can begin.
A stronger economic environment in African-American commu-
nities will attack the infrastructure of residential segregation in two
ways. First, African-Americans will have homes of appreciating
value, making it possible, if they desire, to sell and move elsewhere
or to stay and not fear losing economic ground. Second, the homes
of value will be attractive to whites, who will have an economic
incentive to live in predominantly African-American communities.
In essence, legal strategies focused at creating these types of reme-
dies will strengthen the economic base of predominately black
communities and therefore, provide opportunities for closing the
economic gap between blacks and whites.
While systemic litigation is important to attacking the structure
of residential segregation, a meaningful litigation strategy must
also address individual acts of discrimination. Cases where land-
lords allegedly refuse to rent to people on the basis of race still
exist and are important to litigate. 113 Cases where real estate
agents allegedly limit the type of housing shown to prospective
buyers or renters on the basis of race still exist and must be ad-
dressed as well. 1 4 Even cases involving individual complaints of
lending discrimination are worthwhile. 15 These individual cases
must not be ignored. These cases send a strong message about the
113. See, e.g., Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1992) (alleging that
landlord refused to rent and harrassed applicant on the basis of race); Johnson v.
Hale, 940 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1991) (landlord claimed that her husband would not
allow her to rent to "Negro men").
114. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d
1086 (7th Cir. 1992) (involving allegations of racial steering by real estate broker),
cert. denied sub nom. Ernst v. Leadership Council For Metro. Open Communities, 508
U.S. 972 (1993); Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990) (involv-
ing allegations of racial steering by a real estate agent).
115. See Price v. Gadsden Corp., CV93-PT-1784-M (N.D. Ala.). This case involved
allegations of discrimination against two lenders. One institution would not close the
loan unless a second lender agreed to underwrite the loan. While the second lender
made the decision to refuse to underwrite the loan, the first lender was listed on the
Adverse Action notice required by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act as the only
lender involved in the decision-making process. Thus, both lenders were sued. The
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inappropriateness of individual acts of discrimination, and help to
capture the public imagination about the problem of residential
segregation. 116 Landlords, real estate agents and others are put on
notice that they must comply with the law, and that failing to do so
will have severe consequences. This type of litigation has the po-
tential to reform behavior. If the facts in an individual case of dis-
crimination are sufficiently egregious, substantial injunctive relief
could be ordered beyond instructing the defendant to "go and sin
no more."
117
A strategy of pursuing individual acts of discrimination also as-
sists the prosecution of institutional acts of discrimination. While
institutional acts of discrimination may be distinguished from indi-
vidual acts of discrimination, there may be no such meaningful dis-
tinction at first glance. Pursuing an individual act of discrimination
may lead to the development of an institutional claim. Further, the
critical proof in a case involving an individual act of discrimination
is evidence obtained by testers, indicating that other acts of dis-
crimination have occurred, essentially uncovering an institutional
act of discrimination." 8 For example, the American Family case
itself stemmed not simply from a systemic analysis of the insurance
industry and its impact on the predominantly African-American
community in Milwaukee but from the case of a white American
Family insurance agent, who was told in no uncertain terms: "Quit
writing all those blacks." 1 9 In addition, the case would have been
difficult, if not impossible, to understand and put together without
the individual, but common, experiences of seven African-Ameri-
can homeowners seeking homeowner insurance. 120
Certainly, the above legal strategy would be appropriate for the
Human Rights Commission. The Human Rights Commission must
be prepared to engage in dismantling the barriers to "community"
presented by both institutional and individual acts of discrimina-
tion. Just as the Howard Beach "incident" indicates the existence
of individual acts of discrimination, the existing patterns of residen-
jury ruled in favor of both defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. The appeal was subse-
quently withdrawn pursuant to an agreement reached by the parties.
116. See generally Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 1797 (1990).
117. See, e.g., Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Blvd. Co-op Owners, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
79 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
118. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 32.2 (1995).
119. Second Amended Complaint at Exhibit A, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
120. See generally Second Amended Complaint, American Family (No. 90-C-0759).
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tial segregation suggest the prevalence of institutional acts of dis-
crimination. New York City, like Chicago and Milwaukee, is
"hypersegregated.' 121 The Human Rights Commission must re-
spond to these challenges. It must develop an institutional frame-
work for attacking the structure of residential segregation created
and maintained by institutional and individual actions.
The Human Rights Commission then must have a staff knowl-
edgeable about the past and present manifestations of residential
segregation. Ideally, this would include a substantial number of
well-trained attorneys and an even larger number of investigators
and policy analysts, who could spend time doing the necessary
preparation for casework. The Human Rights Commission must
rely on testers to ferret out individual bias in housing by landlords
and real estate agents. The Human Rights Commission must have
the capacity to conduct and produce the type of empirical data nec-
essary to investigate institutional claims of housing discrimination.
From their work with testers and social scientists, the Human
Rights Commission must strategically undertake both individual
and systemic litigation.
Obviously, as Professor Schill's article points out, the critical is-
sue may be how to fund a legal strategy for combatting residential
segregation.122 Therefore, a legal strategy for the Human Rights
Commission must also include a means to investigate and prose-
cute claims of housing discrimination with limited resources. In the
absence of significant funding for attorneys and investigators, the
Human Rights Commission should consider developing a host of
private-public partnerships which will allow the Commission to be
effective.
If funding limits its ability to hire a large number of lawyers, the
Human Rights Commission should consider hiring a small number
of well-trained and experienced lawyers capable of providing train-
ing and publishing educational materials for members of the pri-
vate bar interested in prosecuting housing discrimination cases. A
partnership between the Human Rights Commission and large pri-
vate law firms in New York City should be developed to serve as a
means to locate attorneys capable of assisting in the litigation of
housing discrimination cases. Large law firms should train young
associates to litigate housing discrimination cases for the Human
Rights Commission in satisfaction of pro bono obligations and in
order to provide training. The more complex cases could be han-
121. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 23, at 75-77.
122. Schill, supra note 10, at 1019.
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died by the small Human Rights Commission fair housing staff
alone or in conjunction with the volunteers from the private bar.
If hiring policy analysts capable of conducting preliminary em-
pirical analyses is cost-prohibitive, then the Human Rights Com-
mission should consider creating a policy network with local
colleges and universities. The Commission could develop and
maintain ties with professors and graduate students in the City
University of New York system or any of the numerous schools in
New York City where there is the technical capacity to conduct
empirical analyses, like logistical regression analysis. The policy
network could even be geographically based, with schools like
Queens College and St. John's University maintaining databases on
the borough of Queens; City College, Columbia University, and
New York University maintaining databases on Manhattan; and
Fordham University maintaining databases in the Bronx. The pol-
icy network, if geographically based, could serve two purposes.
First, the policy network could provide a ready supply of social
scientists willing and able to respond to specific requests for empir-
ical analysis. Second, the policy network could provide an addi-
tional database on the Commission's activities in a given
geographic location. 123
With this type of institutional structure, the Commission could
launch a serious attack on residential segregation in New York
City. With a focus on addressing institutional and individual acts of
discrimination, the Commission will be pursuing cases at the root
of the problem. These cases will have the chance of establishing
meaningful precedents and, if successful, these cases will lead, if
sought, to creative and far-reaching remedies.
Conclusion
Where does New York City go from here: chaos or community?
To the extent that New York City is hypersegregated, "chaos" may
already be here. The case for "community" is clear and compel-
ling. There is no other choice. The barriers to "community," cre-
ated by both institutional and individual acts of discrimination, are
daunting. Nevertheless, strategic litigation, like the American Fam-
ily case, suggests that not all of these barriers are insurmountable.
123. The Commission already has database information on complaints of discrimi-
nation. Members of the proposed policy network would agree to monitor a given
area and conduct additional analyses. For example, St. John's University may create a
database from which a map, identifying problem landlords/owners with numerous
complaints of discrimination, could be generated.
1996] 1051
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
Furthermore, public institutions, like the Human Rights Commis-
sion, have an obligation and the capacity to play a role in disman-
tling these barriers by engaging in strategic litigation. Time is of
the essence, though, in the struggle against residential segregation.
This may well be New York City's "last chance to choose between
chaos and community.' 112 4
124. See KING, supra note 1, at 191.
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